This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
| Autor: | Peleg, Bezalel Peters, Hans |
|---|---|
| ISBN: | 9783642265051 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Produktart: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
| Verlag: | Springer Nature EN |
| Veröffentlicht: | 05.11.2012 |
| Untertitel: | Stable Representations of Constitutions |
| Schlagworte: | C Economic Theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics and Finance Economic theory & philosophy Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Management science Methodology of the Social Sciences Microeconomics Philosophy of Mathematics Quantitative Economics Social Sciences Social research & statistics Welfare economics biotechnology game theory |