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The financial crisis of 2007/08 was caused by a market failure that led to macroeconomically costly government bailouts, caused by the inherent fragility and complexity of the banking system. The resulting implicit state guarantee was anticipated by market participants and distorted risk pricing and market behavior. The aim of recent European regulatory initiatives has been to counteract this phenomenon, known as Too Big To Fail, through the financial participation of those very same market participants. This thesis examines whether the newly created bail-in instrument under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) makes a promising and credible contribution towards remedying distorted market discipline and costly bailout practice.
Autor: Milione, Lara Letizia
ISBN: 9783848774890
Auflage: 1
Sprache: Englisch
Seitenzahl: 302
Produktart: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Verlag: Nomos
Veröffentlicht: 09.12.2022
Untertitel: An Analysis of the Impact of Recovery and Resolution Planning and Loss-Absorbing Capital Requirements on the Credibility of Bail-In
Schlagworte: Abwicklungsplanung Abwicklungsrecht BRRD Bail-In Bankenaufsichtsrecht Bankrecht Mindestkapitalanforderungen Restrukturierungsplanung Single Resolution Mechanism ökonomische Analyse des Rechts